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Human Rights and Relativism
Colleen Good
As a concept, human rights has a long history within
Western thought. The term itself, however, only came into
common usage beginning in the 20th century. It serves as
both a legal and philosophical concept, and as such its
definition is complex. By definition, human rights are
supposed to be universally applicable. Some universalists
argue that human rights as laid out by current human rights
law embodies universal ideals and rights that are universally
relevant and applicable to all people. However, some
relativists have challenged this idea, pointing out that ethical
systems develop in the context of local cultures and that
universal applicability should not be assumed. Within
relativism, there are two stances: first, the more extreme
strong relativist view is that there is no such thing as
universal human rights, as all beliefs and values are
culturally relative and therefore apply only within certain
cultures. Second, the less extreme weak relativist view states
that, while ethical systems do come out of particular cultural
settings, this does not mean that these ethical systems do not
share some overlap—therefore a comprehensive human
rights doctrine may be possible.
In this paper I will be evaluating the conflicting ideas
of human rights as universal and human rights as relative. I
will begin with a discussion of the concept of human rights.
Then I will examine the term “cultural relativism” in
general, followed by a discussion of what cultural relativism
says about human rights. Next I will examine the different
types of cultural relativism discussed in Fernando R.
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Téson’s article called “International Human Rights and
Cultural Relativism.”1 I will evaluate the different types of
relativism elaborated on by Téson, ultimately arguing that
while strong relativism is unfeasible, weak relativism is
something that we should take seriously and examine more
closely in our discussion on human rights. Weak relativism
not only allows for a human rights regime, but it also
actually furthers the discussion on the applicability and
content of human rights.
Human Rights
Philosophically, human rights talk has its roots in
western philosophical and political thought. Julia Ching
characterizes the major influences on human rights as the
following: liberal moral and political philosophy (in
particular liberal English thought and the French
enlightenment), international law, and the American and
French revolutions of the late eighteenth century (Ching 68).
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), whose
main author was a Frenchman named René Cassin, was
actually directly modeled after the values of the French
Revolution, with the twenty-seven articles divided among
the four pillars of “dignity, liberty, equality, and
brotherhood” (Ishay 3). In her book The History of Human
Rights: from Ancient Times to the Globalization Era,
Micheline Ishay acknowledges that the modern conception
of human rights is mostly European in origin. She also states
that one of the largest debates within the human rights
community is the universalist/ cultural relativist debate, and
1

Téson , Fernando R. “International Human Rights and Cultural
Relativism” in The Philosophy of Human Rights, 409-423. ed. Patrick
Hayden. St. Paul, MN: Paragon House, 2001.
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that to communicate effectively within that discussion, one
must properly know human rights’ history and human rights’
philosophic roots (Ishay 10-11). In Anthony Pagden’s
article “Human Rights, Natural Rights, and Europe’s
Imperial Legacy,” Pagden argues that the concept of human
rights comes from an understanding of natural rights with
roots in the goal of justifying imperialist regimes, and that
with the French Revolution, understandings of human rights
became connected to the idea of citizenship (Pagden 171).
Legally, the three major modern human rights law
documents are the following: the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) 1948; the Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights (1966); and the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (1966). The UDHR is generally
seen as the start and foundation of current human rights
discourse and its political structure. The subsequent
documents are seen as complementary to that document,
adding to the rights listed in the UDHR, addressing rights
not previously laid out in the UDHR. Therefore, I will be
examining the issue of rights using these documents as the
modern political authority on human rights. Because I am
examining human rights in its current legal manifestation,
looking at human rights as articulated by these three
documents rather than only through arguments and
statements given by specific philosophers is necessary.
The UN Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights defines human rights as “rights inherent to all
human beings, whatever our nationality, place of residence,
sex, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, language, or
any other status. We are all equally entitled to our human
rights without discrimination. These rights are all
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interrelated, interdependent and indivisible.”2 In addition,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “all
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.
They are endowed with reason and conscience and should
act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”3
International law’s role in the human rights
discussion truly came into play with the creation of such
human rights treaties, many formed under the United
Nations, with many ratified by more than three quarters of
the world’s countries.
As stated earlier, the idea of human rights came from
Western philosophical and political thought, and modern
human rights discourse has its roots in these western ideas.
The same ideas that influenced documents such as the
Declaration for Independence, with its emphasis on the
ideals of individualism and freedom, can be found in the
foundational ideas of human rights (Ching 68). With these
roots, it is clear that the language found in human rights
discourse is culturally specific to the West. This is not to say
that other cultures do not have any ideas that could be
compatible with some sort of human rights framework, but it
is important to acknowledge that in its current form, human
rights discourse is not necessarily framed in a way that all
cultures would identify with or find acceptable.

2

United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
“What are human rights?” United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees,
3
UN General Assembly, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 10 December
1948, 217 A (III),
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3712c.html.
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Some argue that the philosophic roots of human
rights are insignificant: as human rights are universal, so are
the ideas upon which they are founded (Ching 70).
However, human rights were not even portrayed as
universals in the West until relatively recently. Documents
that are cited as espousing older human rights ideals, such as
the Magna Carta or the American Declaration of
Independence, exclude many, giving explicit rights only to
men. In addition, before the seventeenth century, rights were
given to rulers and religious figures, while the common
people only had duties to their superiors (Ching 68). As
ideas of human rights developed in the West, eventually
both Western philosophic and political circles agreed that
human rights should be universal. However, this same
gradual development of ideas did not occur in other areas of
the world. This lack of historic parallels to ideas of universal
human rights in the non-Western world is part of the reason
for opposition to assertions of its universalism.
According to current human rights philosophical and
legal discourse, human rights are argued to be by nature
universal, in part to justify and ensure their universal
application. Human rights are supposed to be rights that we
possess by virtue of being human. As all humans worldwide
share in their humanness, it is thought they must also share
their right to human rights. However, even if there were an
agreement on having human rights apply universally, it
would not mean that there was universal agreement on the
content of those rights. Some take the very existence of
human rights documents and treaties as an indication of
international agreement on the content of human rights.
However, when one looks at where these rights are primarily
articulated (the United Nations), the problems with this
assertion become clear.

32

While the United Nations does claim to be an
organization that, due to its collaborative nature, speaks for
the countries of the world without regional prejudice, due to
the United Nations’ history and structural organization, this
is not always the case. Looking at the world political stage at
the time when the United Nations was founded reveals that
there existed a decidedly Western political bias in the world
political arena. Due to power politics at play then (and now),
it can hardly be said that views espoused under discussions
within that body realistically reflect the true views of the
governments involved let alone the people represented by
those governments. Looking at the Permanent Five in the
Security Council, Western interests are disproportionately
represented: the US, the UK, France, and Russia are vetocarrying members, while the only non-Western
representative with veto power is China. With no vetomembers from South America or Africa, and a
disproportionate representation by the west, the Security
Council can hardly claim balance.4
With power politics taken into consideration, the
question emerges: are current human rights treaties voicing
primarily Western values and political concerns without
properly taking into account the concerns of other groups?
Or, even worse, is the current human rights regime another
less direct form of colonialism, giving Western states an
excuse to meddle in the political affairs of other nations?
While I will not be arguing anything as extreme as the

4

While it is true that at the time the United Nations was formed, Russia
was decidedly different from much of the rest of the Western world,
historically it still has strong Western roots and has interacted primarily
with the Western world. However you count Russia, the West still has a
disproportionate number of permanent members in the Security Council.
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second point in this paper, it deserves to be mentioned that
this point has been argued.
Taking into account the fact that different
civilizations may have different conceptions of human
rights, one question that may be asked is how a consensus
can be reached on this issue. In “A World Consensus on
Human Rights?” Charles Taylor argues that one of the first
obstacles to a consensus on human rights is the language
used. As he says “rights talk has roots in Western culture.
This is not to say that something very like the underlying
norms expressed in schedules of rights don’t turn up
elsewhere. But they are not expressed in this language”
(Taylor 15). He continues by stating that we run into
problems of terminology, with terminology being either too
culturally specific or too vague to be useful, giving the
examples of “dignity” as a Western-based term, and “wellbeing” as a more widely culturally applicable term that is too
vague.
While the Western-oriented language of the human
rights discourse is recognized, some question this fact’s
significance. As a larger question, is the difference only in
the language, or are the very conceptions of human rights
different, or even incompatible? Are there non-Western
conceptions of human rights that are distinct from Western
conceptions, and if so, how do we use them to further the
discussion on human rights?
Relativists were among the first to bring up these
issues. By examining relativism and the relativistuniversalist debate more closely, we will be able to see the
roots of these debates, and can question the significance of
them more effectively. The very basis of the relativistuniversalist debate is the significance of cultural variation in
human rights discourse. So, to answer the question of
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compatibility, we will first examine the idea of cultural
relativism. Before beginning this section, it is important to
note that, while cultural relativism is now recognized as a
philosophical concept, its origins lie in the field of
anthropology, and so my examination of cultural relativism
begins with an examination of its anthropological roots.
Cultural Relativism
Discussions of cultural relativism first began in 1901
with Franz Boas’s work in the field of anthropology with the
publication of the article “The Mind of Primitive Man.”5 In
this article, Boas argued that anthropology as a discipline
must change how it goes about doing ethnography in order
to allow anthropologists to better understand the cultures
they study. He stated that anthropologists should try to strip
themselves of all traces of cultural influence from the area in
which they were born in order to better place themselves
within the mindset of the people of the culture they were
studying. He also stated that the differences between
cultures were not biological, which helped further arguments
against colonialism and ideas of Western cultural
superiority. While the claim that one could strip away one’s
cultural identity was quickly dismissed, Boas’s ideas caused
anthropologists to examine their own cultural identities and
preconceptions more critically before studying other
cultures, and created the idea that all beliefs are culturally
relative and should not be judged outside of their own
cultural realm.

5

Boas, Franz: “The Mind of Primitive Man.” Science, Vol. 13, No. 321
(Feb. 22, 1901): 281-289.
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Modern cultural relativism comes in many different
forms, from claims which are more extreme to less so. Some
cultural relativists claim that all beliefs and ethical systems
are culturally relative, and that therefore there are no
universal moral ideals. Some then argue that no one can be
judged outside of their ethical system, while others just
argue that we should try to be more aware of the fact that,
while we can criticize others, we are doing it from within
our own cultural ethical framework, without a higher
justification for our views. This creates issues for those who
want to be able to make objective criticisms of a culture’s
actions.
Without being able to objectively criticize other
cultures’ ethical practices, the worry that many of Boas’s
contemporaries expressed was that no one could be justified
in doing anything about atrocities such as those committed
by the Nazi’s. Margaret Mead, one of Boas’s students,
argued that because Nazism did not survive as a culture for
three generations, it did not count as a culture. But this
argument seems less than satisfactory, and brings up the
difficult question: what exactly is a “culture’? How do we
distinguish between different cultures? And with the
continuing fragmentation and overlap of identities and
cultures created by an increase in inter-global travel and
communication, how do we weigh these different cultures,
and is a comprehensive dialogue about these cultures
coherent at all? Some aspects of theses questions will be
examined later in this paper, particularly as they relate to
Asia, but essentially what it boils down to is proper
definition. While it is true that any definition of a group of
people is ultimately a simplification (and possibly arbitrary),
as long as that definition is properly outlined, defended, and
consistently used, the problem becomes less overwhelming.
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Cultural Relativism and Human Rights
Cultural Relativism and Anthropology
The first time when cultural relativism and human
rights intersect seems to be the “Statement on Human
Rights” given by the Executive Board of the American
Anthropological Association to the United Nations (per their
request) in 1947, one year prior to “the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights” developed by the United
Nations. In this statement, it becomes clear that there was a
lot of skepticism within the American Anthropological
Association (AAA) as to the political intent behind human
rights. In the statement, the need for the respect of the
differences among cultures is emphasized, and the statement
warns of the dangers of stressing absolute values, as this can
lead to doctrines like the “white man’s burden”—a concept
used for centuries to excuse Western countries’ colonization
and exploitation of countries around the world. The 1947
AAA statement is very entrenched in its times; during this
period, the negative effects of colonialism were still very
fresh in the common consciousness. The idea that some
cultures were more “advanced” than others was used to
excuse oppression by Western governments. Therefore, the
AAA tried to emphasize the merits found in different
cultures, while at the same time stressing that an appeal to
universal ideals could be dangerous, if exploited in the same
ways as modernization and social Darwinism by Western
governments during the colonial period.
Another statement was given by the Association in
1999 that seems to depart from the original1949 statement in
many ways, foremost in its support of human rights. Karen
Engle suggests in “From Skepticism to Embrace: Human
Rights and the American Anthropological Association from
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1947- 1999” that, while attitudes about human rights had
changed within the AAA between 1947 and 1999, attitudes
about relativism had not. Engle suggests that human rights
had proven to have less negative consequences than the
AAA had originally thought. With less government
corruption evident than the corruption the AAA had
witnessed in the early to mid twentieth century, the AAA
was able to feel more comfortable backing a human rights
system, while still cautioning against discrimination based
on the diversity of other cultures.
Engle states that anthropologists must figure out
where to place the limits on the tolerance advocated through
cultural relativism. Engle does recognize the importance of
cultural protection and tolerance advocated by the relativist
stance, but believes steps should be taken to reconcile it with
the universalist human rights position.
Cultural Relativism and Philosophy
While anthropologists may have started many
aspects of the discussion on relativism and human rights,
philosophers have also written a great deal on the subject. It
is important at this point to make distinctions among the
different types of relativism, as some are more useful than
others in furthering the discussion on human rights.
Fernando R. Téson: the Case for International Human
Rights Law
With that in mind, this paper will now examine the
arguments put forth by Fernando R. Téson in his article
“International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism.”
Téson states that cultural relativism is not a legal term, but is
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instead historically derived from anthropology and moral
philosophy (as we have previously discussed). He
acknowledges that cultural relativism can take multiple
forms and states that he will attempt to anticipate arguments
that could be made by any of a variety of types of cultural
relativism.
For the purposes of the debate about international
human rights, Téson defines cultural relativism as the
following: “the position according to which local cultural
traditions (including religious, political, and legal practices)
properly determine the existence and scope of civil and
political rights enjoyed by individuals in a given society”
(Téson 380). He then states that relativists believe that there
are no “transboundary legal or moral standards” (380), the
result being that substantive human rights standards vary,
reflecting the conventions of each culture. An alternative
relativist view, he states, says instead that although a
substantive human rights doctrine could exist as customary
or conventional international law, the meaning of this human
rights doctrine would vary from culture to culture.
The difference between these two relativist stances is
great, as the second will allow for a human rights doctrine
while the first will not. The first relativist stance not only
does not allow for transboundary standards, it does not even
seem to allow for any kind of substantive international law.
This is a very problematic stance to take in our current
international political culture, and seems to question the
meaning and significance of international treaties on smaller
scales as well. By contrast, the second relativist view allows
for human rights doctrine, but simply wishes to emphasize
tolerance for different cultural interpretations of that
doctrine.
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Later in his article, Téson spells out three additional
types of relativism. These types are not specifically linked to
human rights discourse, but to relativism in general, and are
a different way of dividing relativist ideas.
The first type is descriptive relativism. It states that
different societies have different ideas of right and wrong.
This view, he says, is mainly supported by relativist
anthropologists. For the sake of the argument he is going to
give, he is willing to accept descriptive relativism as valid.
Looking at the many variations in legal and ethical traditions
worldwide, I think descriptive relativism clearly holds some
truth. Even within cultures, we have debates on the ethics of
particular situations, so clearly we are not in universal
agreement over ethics.
Metaethical relativism is the second type, and it
states that it is impossible to discover moral truth. A milder
form, he says, would argue that there is no valid means of
moral reasoning that could argue to be as well justified as
the scientific method. This form is in some ways arguing
against universalism, though it is saying that it is impossible
to discover moral truth, not specifically that such truth does
not exist at all.
The third type is called normative relativism, and
states that what a person ought to do and what rights that
person has are culturally dependent. He states that
metaethical relativists, unlike normative relativists, have the
option of attempting to adopt a “reflective equilibrium,” as
argued by John Rawls, by checking moral intuitions against
moral principles. In addition, Téson argues that descriptive
and metaethical relativism do not logically entail normative
relativism. Normative relativism is the type of relativism
that Téson discusses in the rest of his paper (384).
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Téson argues that relativists must respond to the
argument for universalizability in one of two ways. First, a
relativist could state that being a part of a different
community is a “morally relevant circumstance” (386),
giving the relativist the ability to claim that universalism is
still being maintained, just counting culture as a part of the
circumstance of the situation.
He states the relativist would use this to argue that,
with this being true, universalizability would still hold, even
while granting different individuals from different cultures
different basic rights. He also states that some relativists
would claim that the difference here is between abstract and
concrete rights, with the relativist position serving as an
attack on abstract rights.
His argument against this is simple: being a part of a
particular social group or community isn’t a morally relevant
circumstance because where someone is born and their
cultural environment are not related to their moral worth or
entitlement to human rights. No one chooses where they are
born. “If the moral conditions are not morally
distinguishable, the requirements of universalizability fully
applies to statements about individual rights, even where
agents are immersed in different cultural environments”
(387). Finally, he states that relativists confuse the
circumstances under which one learns moral concepts with
the concepts’ meaning.
While his statement that it shouldn’t matter where
someone is born may seem compelling, it could be argued
that, in part, the phrasing of his comment is to blame. His
statement reflects the American idea of everyone being able
to achieve what they want regardless of starting
circumstance, or the “American Dream.” However, this
argument seems to water-down the arguments made by
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relativists. His argument seems to assume a universal set of
rights, with relativists arguing that some people have more
of this ultimate list than others.
A relativist would have a more nuanced view of
rights, with no universal ultimate list. Instead, people from
different circumstances would give different rights different
implications, and different groups could have lists that
looked radically different, or strikingly similar. There would
not be more or less participation in a universal human rights
ideal, as there wouldn’t be a universal human rights ideal (at
least, in the version of relativism he is arguing against here).
In addition, his statement that relativists confuse
circumstances with meaning seems to miss the nuances and
complexity found in relativist discourse. The meaning of any
term has different connotations depending upon language,
cultural heritage, and personal experience. To water this
down to a simple initial learning condition seems to dilute
the true difference in meaning found among different
cultures in regards to terminology and vocabulary.
An example of this more specifically within human
rights discourse would be the idea of “liberty” or even the
idea of a “person.” Depending on the cultural connotations
given to the words (given the words’ use historically within
the culture, and connotations that result from lingual
similarities to other words), the words may have very
different meanings and ethical implications.
He states that the second objection a relativist would
raise against universalism is a logic-based one. He states that
a relativist would argue that (a) the relativist’s only principle
states that culture determines human rights and (b) that
principle (a) is universal. Téson then counters this argument
by saying that (a) is not a substantive moral statement, and
that the requirement of universalizability only applies to
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substantive moral statements. While it is true that strong
relativists would claim that culture determines human rights,
I don’t know that all forms of relativist would, or that this is
necessarily what we should take from the relativist stance. A
more important thing to take from it is that culture helps
determine the initial concepts and ideas upon which human
rights are founded, and that these ideas and the differences
between them should be taken into consideration in attempts
to identify a truly universal system of human rights.
Next, Téson argues against normative relativism by
stating that normative relativism does not follow the idea
that “persons have moral worth qua persons and must be
treated as ends in themselves, not as functions in the ends of
others” (388). In the paragraph following that statement,
Téson argues that we should not allow cultural standards of
oppressive authoritarian regimes to limit human rights.
In this argument, Téson seems to take the relativist
position as the relativist position as argued by repressive
governments. However, this seems an unfair
characterization. If one looks at the history of relativism and
the other ideas espoused by it, the most important part of
relativism seems to be its commitment to tolerance. This
does not necessitate a defense of abusive practices by
governments—again as seen in the history of relativism and
human rights, this is something that relativists have spent a
good deal of energy actively trying to avoid. It seems his
argument was begging the question, using a form of
relativism that few relativists would recognize as such,
instead of critiquing forms of relativism that are more
difficult to argue against.
In his paper, Téson sets out two assumptions he is
making about human rights law (which he says have their
foundations in international law): (1) he states that human
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rights are a part of international law not only by treaty but
also by customary law, and (2) he states that within human
rights law there exists an obligation to “respect the cultural
identities of peoples, their local traditions, and customs”
(382).
He states that his main thesis also has two parts: (i)
“If there is an international human rights standard—the
exact scope of which is admittedly difficult to ascertain—
then its meaning remains uniform across borders” (381) and
(ii) “if there is a possibility of meaningful moral discourse
about rights, then it is universal in nature and applies to all
cultural beings despite cultural differences” (382).
He then states that a “core” human rights law can be
found by looking at a combination of human rights treaties
and diplomatic practice. He calls human rights treaties’
uniformity “surprising” (382). He states that one large
challenge for human rights remains the balance between
human rights law and state sovereignty. While strict
enforcement measures do not really exist, political pressure
has gotten “remarkable results” (383).
Before continuing with the rest of Téson’s article, I
would like to comment on his basic assumptions and goals.
First, Téson believes that, as human rights discourse has
been going on for many decades, it can now be said to be a
part of customary law. I don’t know that one could really
argue this to be the case. Customary international law is
defined by the International Committee of the Red Cross as
unwritten law that is shown to be reflected in state practice.
It must be shown that the international community views
this practice as “required as a matter of law.”6 If some
6

International Committee of the Red Cross, “Customary international
humanitarian law,” International Review of the Red Cross,
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countries have contrary practices, the practice can still count
as customary law if that “contrary practice is condemned by
other states or denied by the government itself.”7
Looking at the many occurrences world-wide of
events which would be classified as human rights abuses
under the current system, and the general lack of unified
legal international response to these events, I would say that
governments hardly treat human rights law as “customary,”
but instead as a thing to be worried about at their
convenience (not a priority, unless it includes political or
economic gain). Just talking about human rights does not
make the current human rights framework customary law:
action must also occur, and more consistently than it has so
far. This very lack of consensus through the actions of the
international community seems to suggest that the current
human rights framework should be more closely evaluated.
Second, while it is true that the human rights
documents do attempt at respect for local cultures and
customs, the concern remains that the very language used in
the documents (derived as it is from western ways of
thinking) imposes culturally specific, insensitive ideas under
the guise of claims to universality. As Taylor argued in his
aforementioned article, word choice is very important, and
words can convey more than intended, and can (intentionally
or not) cut certain people and ideas out of the conversation.
Disagreements exist on concepts even as basic as what the
human person is, and should be further examined to ensure
that when we discuss human rights, we are all talking about
the same thing.
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/section_ihl_customary
_humanitarian_law.
7
Ibid.
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Next, Téson also states that any international human
rights standard must have uniform meaning across borders,
and that to have a meaningful moral discourse on rights,
rights must be universal and apply universally. As the point
of human rights does seem to require that they be universally
applied, this appears to make sense. However, without a
careful examination of the ideas and language used, the idea
that different cultures would interpret these documents the
same way (let alone that they would agree with all of the
ideas espoused by those documents) seems premature. The
United Nations, with all of the squabbles over specific word
use, would likely recognize the importance of word use in
the application of documents (though perhaps, due to
political power and imbalance, it may not be the best place
for a truly equal discussion on rights to take place).
Throughout history, the importance of word choice
in legal documents has been shown in the differences found
in different cultures’ interpretations of documents. One
(perhaps extreme) example is the differences in ideas of
ownership of land found between the Europeans and the
Native Americans. While many abuses by the Europeans
(and eventually Americans) were knowingly perpetrated
against Native Americans, in the early years of contact there
were also some honest misunderstandings over land treaties
due to different definitions of land ownership.
In Europe (especially England) a great deal of
importance was placed on private property, with a lot of
England’s legal doctrine stemming from the idea of the
primacy of private property rights. Native Americans did not
have this idea, especially in respect to land use. Some of
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these differences came out of different styles of land use.8
The result of these different ideas was that when forming
treaties about land ownership, the two groups were not even
having the same conversation. The fact is that things that
may seem small, like the definition and implications of
“owning” land, can in fact have far-reaching consequences
in the implementation and creation of treaties. Especially in
a conversation with such big implications as human rights
has, word use should be examined carefully, and the
implications of different terms should be investigated.
Finally, the fact that Téson finds the universality of
human rights treaties surprising is something that I find
surprising. When dealing with an international arena with
particular international priorities and pressures, why is it
surprising that documents created under those politicallypressured systems are similar in type? In addition, once a
discourse is started with a particular focus, it can be difficult
to change that focus (see most discourse on personal identity
as an example of this phenomenon). In addition, looking
solely at legal human rights documents seems limiting.
Many other avenues for discussion exist which can give a
more complete discussion and evaluation of the human
rights regime.
In the end of Téson’s paper, he argues that there are
two negative “by-products” of relativism: namely, elitism
and conspiracy. Elitism from relativism, he says, states that
“one can appropriately honor human rights in certain
8

Merchant, Carolyn, editor. Major Problems in American
Environmental History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 27.
For more information about differences in ideas of ownership and
interactions with land, see “The Ecological Indian” by Shepard Krech II
and “Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 9001900” by Alfred W. Crosby.
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societies, usually the most sophisticated ones, but not in
others, on account, for example, of the latter’s insufficient
economic development” (389). He states that elitism then
necessarily follows from relativism. In the second,
conspiracy, he says states that “the law of human rights
results from a conspiracy of the West to perpetuate
imperialism” (389). This, he states, neither inevitably
follows from, nor is required by, cultural relativism.
To the first point, it again seems that Téson is
making an unfair characterization of relativism. In his
defense of this view, Téson states that some believe “human
rights are good for the West, but not for much of the nonWestern world.” He claims that these well-intentioned
proposals result in deference to tyrannical governments.
First, this argument seems to assume a universal
human rights regime. If he is trying to argue against the
strongest form of relativism, which it seems that he is, they
would deny the existence of such a universal framework,
and therefore would not state that Western states can
participate in human rights while non-Western ones cannot.
Instead, it seems more likely that they would argue that a
universal human rights discourse cannot exist, and instead
that human rights would be different in different societies,
but not in the sense of people from different places
deserving more or less rights, but in people from different
cultural traditions finding different rights and nuances of
rights important, and taking the implications of these rights
in different directions. In addition, again looking at history,
it seems unlikely that relativists who really had an in-depth
conception of their ideas would take this view. As the point
of relativism is again tolerance and equal treatment of
societies, it seems unlikely that such a Western-centric
viewpoint would be logically necessitated by relativism.
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The second implication, conspiracy, Téson says does
not necessarily follow from relativism. I agree with him on
this point: the idea of human rights as a vehicle for the
continuation of imperialism does not necessarily follow
from relativism. While the conspiracy argument can be used
to excuse the violent or neglectful actions of authoritarian
governments, it does point out a worry for human rights.
Because of the fact that human rights are meant to be
universal, by definition, and because of the fact that such
rules are meant to supersede state sovereignty, this is a
legitimate fear (though not a reason to avoid participating in
the human rights discussion altogether). Looking at the fact
that human rights is historically a Western-based discourse,
and that it came right after the dissolution of colonialism,
seemingly giving Western states yet another reason to
interfere in the affairs of others, it seems understandable that
this fear exists. A way to counter this fear is to make sure
that discussions on human rights, both in law and action,
bring everyone to the table. If human rights law is truly
agreed upon, and if human rights law is invoked more often
than (as some could argue it is today) whenever the West
feels it will be beneficial (politically or financially) for them,
then we will be closer to dispelling these fears.
Conclusion
In conclusion, strong relativism does not make sense
in a human rights framework, as human rights are supposed
to be, by definition, universally applicable. In addition,
strong relativism has troubling implications for international
law as a whole, and the ability of different cultures to
participate in constructive dialogue. However, the fact that
strong relativism is not helpful to the conversation does not
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mean that the problems and challenges to human rights
pointed out by relativist discourse as a whole are
insignificant. Instead of looking to strong relativism, we
should look at the points made by weak relativism: that
different cultures have different cultural and ethical
histories, and that these histories should not be brushed aside
and ignored, but should instead be examined closely to allow
us to further intercultural dialogue on subjects such as
human rights. By examining these differences we will be
able to ensure that greater agreement is reached and decrease
instances of cross-cultural misunderstandings.
In order to ensure that human rights law in its current
form represents the universal human rights ideals in a truly
universal way, a detailed examination of the ideas and
terminology must be undertaken. Because of the
complexities of meaning of various terms and the
importance that word use has on implications for the
implementation of human rights treaties, it is evident that
this investigation would be helpful in furthering the human
rights discussion, allowing more non-Western cultures to
come to the table. Looking at the ideas that come out of
weak relativism, it is clear that changes must be made. In a
further paper, I will argue that an overlapping consensus
model is the best option for furthering the discussion on
human rights. However, for this paper I will simply state that
intercultural dialogue and examination of concepts used in
human rights documents must take place. For supporters of
the overlapping consensus model, an investigation of the
ideas found in human rights documents will allow for an
attempt at an overlapping consensus system for human
rights. For those who believe that human rights in its current
form is truly universal, such an investigation will only serve
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to solidify their stance (if the results are as they expect), so
they have nothing to lose from such an enterprise.
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